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Abstract. We assess the empirical validity of the overall theoretical framework of other-
regarding preferences by focusing on those preference axioms that are common to all the
prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences. This common set of
preference axioms leads to a testable implication: the strict preference ranking of self over
a nite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payos
to self and other will be single-peaked. The extent of single-peakedness varies from a high
of 79% to a low of 54% across our treatments that are based on dictator and trust games.
Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are signicantly less likely to report
single-peaked rankings relative to self-regarding subjects. We delineate the potential rea-
sons for violations of single-peakedness and discuss the implications of our ndings for
theoretical modeling of other-regarding preferences.
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Several models have been proposed to account for the empirical nding that individuals
exhibit other-regarding behavior. Most of the prominent models of outcome-based other-
regarding preferences (including, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Charness and Rabin, 2002) can be subsumed under a common theoretical framework.
Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) highlight that outcome-based models of other-regarding
preferences share a set of core preference axioms.
Preferences are modeled with the help of a binary relation dened over a set whose
elements specify the material payos for self and other. They are assumed to be transitive,
complete, continuous, (strictly or weakly) convex, and strictly monotonic with respect to
payo to self. Preferences are allowed to be non-monotonic with respect to the payo of
other by some models but not by others. Non-monotonicity helps capture the intuitive
idea that an individual might be willing to sacrice his own payo in order to decrease the
payo of another individual. The indierence curves of an individual can thus be positively
sloped at certain points in the space of payos to self and other.
A testable implication follows from the core axioms regarding the structure of preference
rankings. Intuitively, the strict ordinal preference ranking of an individual over a nite
number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of payos to self and other
will be single-peaked, where the term `single-peaked' is being used precisely in the way it
is used in social choice theory (Black, 1958).
This paper aims to assess the empirical validity of the assumptions underlying the
whole class of outcome-based models of other-regarding preferences by eliciting preference
rankings and examining the extent of single-peakedness. Self-regarding preferences are
treated as a special case of other-regarding preferences in this framework. Consequently,
preferences of self-regarding subjects will also be single-peaked if dierent alternatives
specify dierent payos for self.
Our experiments essentially employ variants of the standard dictator game (Forsythe
et al., 1994). Subjects who report non-single-peaked rankings in our experiment can not
be accounted for by any existing theory of other-regarding preferences. Thus, testing for
single-peakedness goes beyond testing the empirical validity of a particular theory of other-
regarding preferences. It gives an idea regarding whether or not the preference structures
of most experimental subjects can be accommodated by at least one of the theories.
Figure 1 illustrates the idea of single-peakedness by considering ve alternatives lying
on a downward sloping straight line in the two-dimensional space of material payos to
self and other. Suppose the preferences of self can be modeled with the help of a binary
relation which is complete, transitive, continuity, strictly convex, strictly monotonic with
respect to own payo but not necessarily monotonic with respect to the payo of other.
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Figure 1: Core axioms imply single-peakedness
Figure 1(A) illustrates a family of indierence curves for self consistent with these
preference axioms. Given the indierence curves, the ordinal preference ranking of the ve
alternatives lying on the downward sloping line can be identied.1 We can order the ve
alternatives on the horizontal axis with respect to the payo to self (or, other) as shown
in Figure 1(B). The single-peaked ordinal preference ranking over the ve alternatives is
denoted on the vertical-axis.
Intuitively, preference rankings over a set of alternatives that can be ordered on a one-
dimensional axis are single-peaked if, among any two alternatives that are both to the left
or to the right of the most preferred alternative, the alternative that is closer to the most
preferred alternative is preferred over the alternative that is farther. In other words, if we
move along the axis on which the alternatives are ordered, then (i) preferences monoton-
ically increase/decrease or (ii) rst they monotonically increase and then monotonically
decrease.
All questions addressed in this paper revolve around the idea of single-peakedness.
Section 2 provides an example to clarify the nature and usefulness of the questions we
shall investigate. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures including
a detailed description of the mechanism used to elicit rankings. Section 4 lays out the
main hypotheses and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes with a detailed
discussion of the results with an emphasis on delineating the potential reasons for non-
single-peakedness, their relation to the existing literature, and avenues for future work.
1Any indierence curve will contain none, one, or at most two out of the ve alternatives on the
downward sloping line if the preference axioms are satised. For ease of exposition we are illustrating the
case where all the ve alternatives lie on distinct indierence curves. Section 2 provides details of the case
where two alternatives may lie on the same indierence curve.
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Figure 2: The six possible strict preference rankings in the mini-dictator game D
2. Single-peakedness
Consider a mini-dictator game D involving two agents { the inactive recipient and the
active dictator who can give 0, or 5, or 10 out of 20 to the recipient. It is standard practice
to label any subject who would give 10 as an `other-regarding' agent and claim that his
preferences are consistent with at least one model of other-regarding preferences subsumed
in the framework of Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008).
This claim amounts to making the implicit assumption that the subject's (strict) rank-
ing over the three alternatives is giving 10  5  0 rather than 10  0  5. However, we
can not rule out the latter ranking solely on the basis of the subject's observed choice of
giving 10.2 To the best of our knowledge, the latter ranking can not be accommodated in
any existing outcome-based or intention-based theory of other-regarding preferences.
Figure 2 illustrates the six possible strict rankings of the three alternatives in game D.
Rankings R2 to R5 are single-peaked. As we move along the horizontal axis, preferences
corresponding to ranking R2 (R5) decrease (increase) monotonically. R3 and R4 re
ect
preferences that rst increase and then decrease as we move along the horizontal axis.
Rankings R1  0  10  5 and R6  10  0  5 are incompatible with the existing
framework of other-regarding preferences. These two rankings are non-single-peaked since
preferences rst decrease and then increase as we move along the horizontal axis. A subject
whose ranking is R1  0  10  5 starts with the most selsh choice of giving 0 as his
rst-ranked alternative but then his selshness runs out and he ranks giving 10 above
giving 5. A subject whose ranking is R6  10  0  5 starts with the most generous
choice of giving 10 but then his generosity runs out and he ranks giving 0 above giving
5. Clearly, rankings R1 and R6 violate single-peakedness in dierent ways and thus lend
themselves to dierent behavioral interpretations.
2We ignore the possibility of indierence in the present discussion in order to clearly convey our basic
ideas and discuss the reasons for doing so at the end of Section 2.1.
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to give 0 but non-single-peaked for most of the subjects who give 10. In other words,
generosity may run out signicantly more often than selshness. If this is indeed the case,
then the framework of other-regarding preferences would fail to accommodate those very
subjects whom it essentially aims to accommodate (i.e., the subjects who give something
other than 0). In contrast, our condence in the empirical validity of the framework would
be greatly enhanced if (i) the overall extent of non-single-peakedness is quite low and (ii)
there is no systematic dierence in single-peakedness of the underlying preference rank-
ings across subjects who dier in their choices. Our experiments are therefore primarily
designed to (i) measure the extent of single-peakedness and (ii) identify who violates single-
peakedness by directly eliciting the preference rankings of subjects.3
2.1. Core axioms imply single-peakedness
Let % be the binary preference relation of an agent dened over the set X  R2
+. A
representative element of X will be denoted as (xs;xo), where xs 2 R+ denotes the material
payo to self and xo 2 R+ denotes the material payo to other. Let  and  be the strict
preference relation and the indierence relation derived from %.
Completeness, transitivity, and continuity of % imply there exists a real-valued utility
function u : X ! R which represents % and strict convexity implies that indierence curves
in the payo space can not have linear segments. If % is strictly monotonic in both xs
and xo, then indierence curves in the payo space must be negatively sloped everywhere
as shown in Fig. 3(A). However, if % is strictly monotonic in xs but not always strictly
monotonic in xo, then an indierence curve can be positively sloped at certain points in the
payo space as shown in Fig. 3(B). Let A = fa1;a2;:::;ang be a nite set of alternatives
lying on any strictly downward sloping or strictly upward sloping straight line in the space
of payos to self and other.
Proposition 1: Any strict ordinal ranking consistent with a weak (or strict) ordinal rank-
ing over elements of A will be single-peaked if preferences are complete, transitive, contin-
uous, strictly convex, and strictly monotonic in xs.
Consider any downward sloping straight line in the space of payos. Given the as-
sumptions on %, any alternative ai 2 A must lie on one, and only one, indierence curve.
However, an indierence curve may pass through none, one, or at most two alternatives
belonging to A as shown in Figures 3(C) and 3(D).
3Essentially, we ask the dictator to rank ve alternatives specifying payos for himself and the recipient.
Relatively higher ranked alternatives are used to determine payos with relatively greater probability.
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erence curves corresponding to a preference relation that satises the
core axioms and is also monotonic with respect to payo of other. (B) Indierence curves
corresponding to a preference relation that satises the core axioms but is not always
monotonic with respect to payo of other. (C) An example where no indierence curve
contains more than one of the alternatives in a nite set. (D) An example where an


















We can order the alternatives in the set A on a horizontal one-dimensional axis in
terms of the payo to self (or other) and plot their ordinal ranks on the vertical axis. If all
alternatives lie on dierent indierence curves, then they can easily be assigned dierent
ordinal ranks and the obtained ranking over the alternatives will automatically be a strict
ranking. Single-peakedness requires that, among any two alternatives that are both on
the left or the right of the rst-ranked alternative, the alternative that is closer to the
rst-ranked alternative is ranked above the alternative that is farther from the rst-ranked
alternative. It is easily veried that the strict ordinal ranking will be single-peaked.
We will get a weak ordinal ranking over the alternatives when two alternatives in A lie on
the same indierence curve. Suppose the obtained weak ordering is a3  a2  a1  a4  a5.
Two strict rankings are consistent with this weak ranking: a3  a2  a1  a4  a5 and
a3  a2  a4  a1  a5. Both of these strict rankings will be single-peaked. We omit the
explanation for the case where the nite number of alternatives lie on a strictly upward
sloping straight line since it is similar to the case of a strictly downward sloping line. It
can also be veried that monotonicity with respect to xs is super
uous.
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a preference relation that satises the core axioms. Clearly, the preferences of a subject over
the whole space of payos need not be consistent with the core axioms even if his ranking is
single-peaked over the nite set of alternatives used in the experiment. The extent of non-
single-peakedness observed in our experiments will thus provide a conservative estimate.
Indierence curves may have linear segments if preferences are weakly convex. We
elicit strict rankings in our experiment. Subjects may be indierent between some of
the alternatives and, when we compel them to report a strict ranking, the manner in
which subjects break ties could lead them to report a non-single-peaked strict ranking.
In particular, subjects who treat own payo and other's payo as perfect substitutes can
report any ranking over a nite number of divisions of a xed amount in the dictator game.
From a practical perspective, we elicit strict rankings primarily for convenience. Our
elicitation method can be easily modied whereby subjects can be asked to report indier-
ences. From an empirical perspective, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and
Markovits (2007) report that the fraction of subjects who treat own and other's payos
as perfect substitutes in standard dictator games is 6.2% and 2.63%, respectively. Finally,
from a comparative-methodological perspective, the possibility of indierence is as much
a concern when choices are elicited in one-shot interactions. If we entertain the possibility
of indierence, then we can not conclude that a subject who gives half of the pie to his
recipient is more altruistic than one who gives nothing in a one-shot dictator game where
choices are elicited. We therefore believe that eliciting strict rankings only marginally af-
fects the generality of our study.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
We employ ve treatments (Table 1) that are variants of dictator and trust games (). The
experiments were conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics,
Jena, Germany, from March 2011 to June 2011. Subjects were students at the University
of Jena. We used a between-subjects design and the games were played only once in each
session. We have data on 96 subjects (48 men and 48 women) for each treatment.
3.1. Treatments
Each alternative in treatment DB (Dictator-Baseline) prescribes a division of 20 between
the dictator and the recipient. The dictator has to strictly rank the ve alternatives. Note
that any n alternatives can be strictly ranked in n! ways where n! = n  (n   1)  :::  2  1.
Out of these n! rankings only 2n 1 rankings will be single-peaked (Craven, 1992).
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Treatment The ve alternatives
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
1. DB - Dictator-Baseline (0, 20) (2, 18) (4, 16) (7, 13) (9, 11)
2. TB - Trust-Baseline (0, 20) (2, 18) (4, 16) (7, 13) (9, 11)
3. TE - Trust-Equality (0, 20) (2, 18) (4, 16) (7, 13) (10, 10)
4. DM - Dictator-Monotonicity (0, 20) (4, 16) (7, 13) (10, 10) (16, 11)
5. TM - Trust-Monotonicity (0, 20) (4, 16) (7, 13) (10, 10) (16, 11)
Notes: The rst entry in each alternative is the payo of the recipient (trustor) in treatments based on
the dictator (trust) game. The payos refer to actual euro amounts used in the experiments. The dictator
has to rank the ve alternatives in treatments based on the dictator game. In treatments based on the
trust game, the rst mover { the trustor { has to choose either OUT or IN. If he chooses OUT, then the
game ends with the trustor receiving 5 and the trustee receiving 0. If the trustor chooses IN, then the
trustee ranks the ve alternatives.
The ve alternatives in DB lie on a downward sloping straight line in the two-dimensional
space of monetary payos to self and other. However, they can be ordered in terms of
the payo to either self or other on a one-dimensional axis. Consequently, only 16 out
of the 120 possible strict rankings (13%) in DB will be single-peaked. It is only these
16 single-peaked rankings that are permitted by the theoretical models of outcome-based
other-regarding preferences. Intention-based theories have no bite in the dictator game.
Table 2 lists the 16 single-peaked rankings in treatment DB. We represent each alter-
native in terms of the amount that can be given by the dictator to the recipient. The
existing theories would label a subject who reports the ranking r1  0  2  4  7  9
as `self-regarding.' A subject who reports any of the remaining 15 single-peaked rankings
will be labeled as `other-regarding.' Subjects who report a ranking dierent from these 16
rankings can not be accommodated in any theory of other-regarding preferences.
Treatment TB (Trust-Baseline) was conducted to check the robustness of the results
obtained from treatment DB. The game played by subjects in treatment TB is a variant
of the standard trust game. The rst mover { the trustor { has to choose either OUT or
IN. If he chooses OUT, then the game ends with the trustor receiving 5 and the trustee
receiving 0. If the trustor chooses IN, then the trustee is asked to rank the ve alternatives
which are identical to the ve alternatives faced by the dictator in DB. The task faced by
a trustee in TB is identical to that faced by a dictator in DB. Thus, 16 out of the 120
possible strict rankings of the ve alternatives in TB will be single-peaked.
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r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15 r16
g1 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 9
g2 2 0 4 4 4 2 2 2 7 7 7 4 4 4 9 7
g3 4 4 0 7 7 0 7 7 2 2 9 2 2 9 4 4
g4 7 7 7 0 9 7 0 9 0 9 2 0 9 2 2 2
g5 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 0 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0
Notes: These rankings are the 16 single-peaked rankings in treatment TB as well. gi refers to the amount
given by self to other according to the ith-ranked alternative. Replacing `9' by `10' throughout the table
gives the list of the 16 single-peaked rankings in treatment TE.
Our objective is to examine whether there is any dierence in the extent of single-
peakedness across DB and TB. No existing theory of outcome-based or intention based
other-regarding preferences would predict a dierence in the extent of single-peakedness
across the rankings submitted by dictators in DB and trustees in TB.4 Dierences in rst-
ranked alternatives (which may be thought of as a proxy for the choice subjects would
have made if asked to choose one of the ve alternatives) or in the distribution of rankings
across these two treatments are of little importance for us given the focus of our analysis.
Treatment TE (Trust-Equality) diers from treatment TB in only one respect: alter-
native (9;11) in TB has been replaced with (10;10) in TE. As in treatments DB and TB,
16 out of the 120 possible strict rankings of the ve alternatives in TE will be single-
peaked. Prior research has shown that minor changes to the set of alternatives can have
signicant impact on choices made by subjects (G uth, Huck, and M uller, 2001; List, 2007,
Bardsley, 2008). We shall argue later that such results can potentially be accommodated
in the framework of Cox et al. (2008). Our interest lies in examining whether there is
any dierence in the extent of single-peakedness across TB and TE. No existing theory of
other-regarding preferences would predict such a dierence.
Treatments DM and TM allow us to classify subjects in a more rened manner because
we can identify non-monotonicity of preferences with respect to the payo of other.5 As we
shall see, this permits a better analysis of who violates single-peakedness. Note that payos
to self and other sum to 20 in the rst four alternatives but not in the fth alternative
which involves giving 16 to other and keeping 11 for self.
4This claim is obvious for outcome-based theories. In case of intention based theories, the reader
may verify that the specication of the utility function is such that preferences over alternatives will be
single-peaked for any xed second-order belief of the trustee.
5The choice of these treatments was inspired by the treatment involving step-shaped budget sets in
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007).
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However, only the rst four alternatives whose payos sum to 20 lie on a straight line.6
Only these four alternatives can be used to discuss the notion of single-peakedness. These
four alternatives can be ordered on a one-dimensional axis in terms of the payo to self
(or other) and allow for 8 single-peaked rankings (Table 3).
Consider any one of these 8 single-peaked rankings, say, rm
7  7  10  4  0. The
fth alternative { (16;11) { can potentially be placed at ve locations to arrive at a strict
ranking of all the ve alternatives: it can be above giving 7, below giving 0, or anywhere in
between. Each of the resulting ve strict rankings will be consistent with the core axioms
(see Figure 4). The crucial thing to note is that preferences will be non-monotonic with
respect to the payo of other if alternative (10;10) is ranked above (16;11) irrespective
of the exact placement of these two alternatives in the overall ranking of the subject (see
Figures 4(C), 4(D), and 4(E)).
In general, there exist ve theoretically consistent strict rankings for each of the 8
single-peaked rankings of the four alternatives that sum to 20. Thus, 40 out of the 120
possible strict rankings of all the ve alternatives in treatments DM and TM are consis-
tent with the theoretical framework of other-regarding preferences (see Table S2 in the
Supplement). There should be no dierence in the fraction of rankings consistent with the
existing theories when we compare dictators in DM with trustees in TM.
3.2. Implementation
Experiments were conducted in a networked computer laboratory. The experimental games
were programmed using the software Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
(z-Tree) developed by Urs Fischbacher (2007).
3.2.1. General procedures
During each session, while entering the lab, each subject picked a card indicating the
computer terminal number. The lab can accommodate 32 subjects and so excess subjects
were given the show-up fee of e2.50 and asked to leave. Instructions for the experiment were
distributed after all the subjects had been seated. An experimenter read the instructions
aloud after all subjects nished reading instructions on their own. Participants were then
asked to answer a questionnaire to check their understanding of the instructions. The
experiment started after all participants correctly answered all the questions.7
6The fact that the (16;11) alternative and any one of the rst four alternatives will also lie on a line is
inconsequential for our discussion.
7The number of subjects who were not able to answer all the questions on the rst attempt varied from
1 to 3 (out of 32) across all the sessions.
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1 0 4 4 4 7 7 7 10
gm
2 4 0 7 7 4 4 10 7
gm
3 7 7 0 10 0 10 4 4
gm
4 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 0
Notes: gm
i refers to the amount given by self to other according to the ith-ranked alternative among the
rst four alternatives whose payos sum to 20.
Figure 4: An example of the ve theoretically feasible preference rankings of all the ve
alternatives that are consistent with the rm
7 ranking of the four alternatives other than the
(16;11) alternative.
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ve treatments { DB and DM { are based on the dictator game. Both
subjects in each dictator-recipient pair were asked to rank the alternatives in the role of the
dictator in treatments DB and DM. After all subjects had submitted their rankings, one
subject in each pair was randomly determined to be the actual dictator and his rankings
were used for determining the payos to both subjects in the pair. Subjects were told that
both subjects in a given pair will be paid according to the rst, second, third, fourth, or
fth ranked alternative of the actual dictator with monotonically decreasing probabilities
of 0:50, 0:30, 0:15, 0:05, and 0:00.
The remaining three treatments { TB, TE, and TM { are based on the trust game.
The strategy-vector method was used in these treatments. Both subjects in each pair rst
ranked the alternatives in the role of the trustee with the knowledge of the probabilities of
implementing the payos. Then both subjects made the choice between OUT and IN in
the role of the trustor without any information about decisions made by other subjects.
The procedure we followed to implement the payos was as follows. One card was
drawn from the box containing the 32 terminal IDs when all subjects nished making all
the decisions in any given session. The participant sitting on the terminal corresponding to
drawn card was asked to come forward. (S)he was then shown a box containing 100 cards
(50 red, 30 blue, 15 black, and 5 white). The box was closed, vigorously shaken, and the
participant was asked to draw one card from the box. The color of the card drawn by the
participant determined which rank will be used to determine the payos for all participants
in the session. For example, if a blue card was drawn in a session, then the second-ranked
alternative was used to determine the payos for all pairs.
The actual roles (dictator/recipeint and trustor/trustee) were then randomly deter-
mined by the computer. Both subjects in a given pair were paid according to the ranking
submitted by the actual dictator in treatments based on the dictator game. In treatments
based on the trust game, the ranking provided by the actual trustee was used to determine
payos if the actual trustor chose IN. If the actual trustor had chosen OUT, then he got
5 and the actual trustee got 0. Payos were displayed on the computer screen of each
subject. Subjects were then asked to approach the experimenter one by one in the order
of their terminal IDs, collect their earnings in cash, and leave the lab.
Before describing the details of the ranking elicitation mechanism, we discuss three
potential concerns regarding the experimental design. First, it is well known that choices
made by trustees may depend upon whether one uses the `play' method or the `strategy'
method (Casari and Cason, 2010). The strategy method and the play method may lead to
dierences in rst-ranked alternatives and/or the distribution of rankings but there is no
theoretical reason to believe that single-peakedness of rankings would be aected. None of
the existing theories of other-regarding preferences predict such a dierence. Hence, there
does not seem to be any reason not to use the strategy method.
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decisions as dictators (trustees and trustors) in treatments based on the dictator (trust)
game. Whatever concerns could arise from this design feature are minor issues from a
theoretical perspective as they can be easily eliminated by conducting experiments where
roles are assigned apriori.8 Finally, single-peakedness should not be sensitive to the fact
that our experiments were single-blind but one could easily investigate whether or not this
is the case.
3.2.2. Ranking-elicitation mechanism
In each treatment subjects were told that both subjects in the pair will be paid according
to the rst, second, third, fourth, or fth ranked alternative of the actual dictator (or the
actual trustee) with monotonically decreasing probabilities of 0:50, 0:30, 0:15, 0:05, and
0:00. We shall, henceforth, refer to this mechanism as the MDP mechanism.9
Subjects report one out of 120 possible rankings of the ve alternatives in every treat-
ment. Each ranking induces a lottery. Hence, reporting a ranking eectively amounts to
choosing one one out of 120 possible lotteries where each possible outcome of the lottery
species monetary payos for self and other. Since the games are played only once, pro-
viding one ranking is equivalent to one-task lottery choice experiments wherein subjects
have the incentive to choose the most preferred lottery irrespective of the structure of their
preferences over lotteries.10 The key features of the MDP mechanism are best understood
by answering the following two questions.
[Q1] What should be the structure of preferences over lotteries so that the reported rank-
ing of sure alternatives can be unambiguously interpreted as the true preference ranking
over the sure alternatives?
[Q2] What must be the structure of the reported ranking so that it is in line with the
existing theories of other-regarding preferences?
To answer [Q1], suppose that a subject behaves in accordance with some theory of
decision making under risk according to which lotteries are evaluated using special cases
of the functional
8Subjects were paid according to their decision in one of the two roles and thus `portfolio eects' should
not be a concern (Cox, 2010).
9We thank Tim Cason for drawing our attention to the work of Chakravarty, Ma, and Maximiano
(2011) who have independently used this mechanism to study a dierent question.
10Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt (2011) clarify that, in theory, the one-task mechanism is the best available
way to induce subjects to report their preferences over lotteries truthfully since it is immune to the concerns
(wealth eects and portfolio eects) that arise in multi-task lottery choice experiments.
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5 X
i=1
i(p)  u(ai) =
5 X
i=1
i(p)  u(gi;ki); (1)
where
(i) i(p) is the decision weight on the ith-ranked alternative which may depend on the
whole vector of the objectively given probabilities p = (p1;p2;p3;p4;p5); and,
(ii) u(ai) = u(gi;ki) is the utility derived from the ith-ranked alternative ai which prescribes
giving gi to other and keeping ki for self.
Note that subjects behaving in line several theories of decision making under risk would
evaluate lotteries according to the above functional (for example, Expected Utility The-
ory (Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1944), Prospect Theory (Kahnemann and Tversky,
1979), Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory (Quiggin, 1982), and the dual theory of
Expected Utility Theory (Yaari, 1987)).
Suppose lotteries are evaluated according to the above mentioned functional. The
reported ranking of alternatives can be unambiguously interpreted as the preference rank-
ing over the sure alternatives if the decision weights are monotonically decreasing, i.e.,
if i(p) > j(p) for 1  i < j  5. This requirement clearly holds for subjects who
behave according to Expected Utility Theory irrespective of their attitudes towards risk
since i(p) = pi, for all 1  i  5, in such a case.
If a subject in our experiment behaves in accordance with any theory of decision mak-
ing under risk wherein (i) lotteries are evaluated using the above mentioned functional and
(ii) the decision wights are monotonically decreasing, then the answer to [Q2] is obvious:
the reported ranking must be single-peaked for it to be consistent with existing theories of
other-regarding preferences.
4. Hypotheses
4.1. Extent of single-peakedness
The distribution of rst-ranked alternatives may dier across treatments. The distribution
of rankings may also dier. However, if the analytical framework of other-regarding pref-
erences is empirically sound, no subject should report a non-single-peaked ranking in any
treatment. Even if we acknowledge the possibility of random errors, there should be no
dierence in the extent of single-peakedness across (i) DB and TB, (ii) TB and TE, and (iii)
DM and TM. This is because the number of single-peaked rankings for both treatments
within each of these three pairwise comparisons is identical.
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alternative with treatment TB which instead contains (10;10). We are not interested in
examining whether there is a dierence in the distribution of rst-ranked alternatives across
TB and TE. Dierences in rst-ranked alternatives can potentially be accommodated by
allowing not only the choices of others but also the structure of the set of alternatives to
aect whether an agent adopts a more or less altruistic preference structure in accordance
with the framework of Cox et al. (2008).
In the terminology of Cox et al. (2008), the mere presence of (10;10) in place of (9;11)
in the set of alternatives may lead the trustees to adopt a relatively `more (less) altruistic'
preference structure. Thus, choices (or, rst-ranked alternatives) could dier across these
two treatments. Nonetheless, the preferences under any scenario will be single-peaked if
the core preference axioms are satised. Hence, our test for the empirical validity of the
framework will be that there should be no dierence in the extent of single-peakedness
across TB and TE.
We would also like to add that if the existing framework captures the preference struc-
tures of men and women equally well, then the distribution of rst-ranked alternatives
and/or rankings of men and women may be dierent in any given treatment but the extent
of single-peakedness should not be dierent.
4.2. Who violates single-peakedness
We shall follow the terminology introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and classify sub-
jects in terms of their aversion towards advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Our
results do not depend in any way on this choice of the classication scheme. We use it
because it provides a simple language to classify subjects across all our treatments.
First, consider treatments DB, TB, and TE where each alternative sums to 20 and leads
to a situation of (strictly or weakly) advantageous inequality for the decision maker. Let
g1 denote the amount given by a subject to other according to his rst-ranked alternative
in treatments DB, TB, and TE. Subject S1 will be said to exhibit a stronger aversion to
advantageous inequality (henceforth, AAI) than subject S2 if g1(S1) > g1(S2). Note that
knowing only the rst-ranked alternative does not allow us to infer whether the overall
ranking reported by a subject is single-peaked or not.
It is important to note that the way we classify subjects is in line with how subjects
would be classied if they were asked to choose one of the ve alternatives rather than rank
them. Our analysis of who violates single-peakedness will be based on the assumption that
the rst-ranked alternative in our treatments would be the choice subjects would make if
they were asked to choose one of the ve alternatives.11
11We believe this is a reasonable assumption to make. Nonetheless, we conducted two additional treat-
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1 denote the amount given by a subject to other according to his rst-ranked
alternative among the four alternatives that sum to 20 in treatments DM and TM. In
treatments DM and TM, the rst four alternatives lead to a situation of (strictly or weakly)
advantageous inequality for the decision maker whereas the fth alternative {(16;11) {
leads to a situation of disadvantageous inequality.
We can classify subjects in terms of AAI on the basis of gm
1 in treatments DM and
TM. We can also classify subjects in these two treatments in terms of their aversion to
disadvantageous inequality (henceforth, ADI). Preferences are non-monotonic with respect
to the payo of other if alternative (10;10) is ranked above (16;11), irrespective of the exact
placement of these two alternatives in the overall ranking. Revealing non-monotonicity with
respect to the payo of other is observationally equivalent to revealing ADI. In contrast,
if a subject ranks alternative (16;11) above (10;10), then he has no (or very low) ADI.
As an example, suppose the rankings of subjects S3 and S4 in treatment DM in terms
of the amount given to other turn out to be 7  4  10  0  16 and 16  4  10 
7  0, respectively. S3 will be classied as being relatively more AAI than S4 because
gm
1 (S3) = 7 > 4 = gm
1 (S4). In addition, subject S3 shows ADI since he ranks (10;10) above
(16;11), whereas subject S4 does not.12
To summarize, we shall classify subjects into a total of ve categories based on their
AAI in treatments DB, TB, and TE. In treatments DM and TM, subjects will be classied
into eight categories depending on the four possible levels of AAI and two levels of ADI.





g1 in treatments DB, TB, and TE
gm






0 if (16;11)  (10;10) in treatments DM and TM
1 if (10;10)  (16;11) in treatments DM and TM
(3)
Our nal hypothesis is that there should be no dierence in the extent of single-
ments (using 64 subjects) that were similar to treatments DB and TM except that subjects had to choose
one out of the ve alternatives rather than rank the ve alternatives. We found no dierence in the distri-
bution of rst-ranked alternatives in the ranking version of treatment DB and the distribution of choices in
its choice version [P = 0:948, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test]. The same result holds for the comparison
between ranking and choice versions of treatment TM [P = 0:817, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test]. We
therefore feel reasonably condent that the rst-ranked alternative in our treatments would be the choice
subjects would make if they were asked to choose one of the ve alternatives.
12The ranking of subject (S4) S3 is (not) permitted by existing theories because the ranking over the
four alternatives other than (16;11) is (not) single-peaked. Of course, we can not determine the (non)
single-peakedness of the overall ranking if we only know gm
1 and the relative ranking of alternatives (16;11)
and (10;10).
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treatments DB, TB, and TE; and, in terms of both AAI and ADI in treatments DM and
TM. In particular, subjects who show AAI, or ADI, or both, should be as likely to exhibit
single-peakedness as those who will be labeled as `self-regarding' subjects.
We classify subjects as they would be in experiments where choices are elicited and
examine whether their overall ranking is single-peaked. We shall therefore `label' a sub-
ject as self-regarding if (i) he does not show AAI in treatments DB, TB, and TE and (ii)
shows neither AAI nor ADI in treatments DM and TM. Put dierently, a subject will be
`labeled' as self-regarding if (i) g1 = 0 in treatments DB, TB, and TE and (ii) gm
1 = 0 and
alternative (16;11) is ranked above (10;10) in treatments DM and TM.13
5. Data Analysis
We used a between-subjects design. Each session involved 32 dierent subjects. Three
sessions of each treatment were conducted. Our data comprise of 96 observations for each
treatment. The treatments were gender balanced and thus we have data on 48 men and 48
women in each treatment.14 We shall treat each observation as an independent observation
since the games were played only once during a session.
5.1. Overall extent of single-peakedness
Pooling data from all sessions we nd that 75% of subjects (358 out of 480) report single-
peaked rankings (Table 4). In fact, the fraction of single-peaked rankings is at least 79%
in all treatments except the TE treatment. If subjects were to behave randomly, then the
extent of single-peakedness would be 13% in treatments DB, TB, and TE, and 33% in
treatments DM and TM.
The hypothesis that subjects behave randomly is emphatically rejected for every treat-
ment using a test of proportions. In addition, there is no statistical dierence in the extent
of single-peakedness across men and women in any treatment and in the pooled data. The
fraction of men and women reporting single-peaked rankings is almost identical in every
treatment and exactly identical in the pooled data.
13We stress the word `labeled' because, in terms of the amount given to other, a self-regarding subject
should report (i) the ranking 0  2  4  7  9 in treatments DB and TB, (ii) the ranking 0  2  4 
7  10 in treatment TE, and (iii) the ranking 0  4  7  16  10 in treatments DM and TM. However,
given the nature of our exercise, we shall use the labels 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' as described
in the text above throughout the paper. Subjects whose ranking starts as 16  0 will end up being labeled
as `self-regarding.' This drawback, however, does not aect any of the results reported in this paper.
14The sessions were not gender balanced. No restriction was placed on the gender composition while
recruiting subjects for the rst (or the rst and second) session of any treatment. Restrictions were then
imposed for the latter session(s) to ensure gender balance.
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Data Treatment






















Notes: N, M, and W refer to data on all subjects, data only on men, and data only on women, respectively.
The fraction reported in the table is ratio of number of subjects who report a single-peaked ranking and
the total number of subjects. The numbers inside the parentheses report the corresponding percentage
rounded o to the nearest integer.
5.2. Single-peakedness across treatments
As discussed earlier, there should be no dierence in the extent of single-peakedness across
(i) DB and TB, (ii) TB and TE, and (iii) DM and TM. Note that we are comparing only
those treatments that permit equal number of theoretically feasible rankings.
There is no statistical dierence in the extent of single-peakedness across treatments
DB and TB [2(1) = 0:000, P = 1:000]. The same result holds for the comparison between
treatments DM and TM [2(1) = 0:131, P = 0:717].15 Both these results hold if we look
at the data on men and women separately. The extent of single-peakedness is, however,
signicantly dierent across treatments TB and TE [2(1) = 13:5, P < 0:001].
The presence of (10;10) impacts the behavior of subjects in treatment TE in several
ways. For instance, we nd weak dierence in the distribution of rst-ranked alternatives
across these treatments [P = 0:062, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test].16 This nding is
similar to the results obtained by G uth, Huck, and M uller (2001) and Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher (2003) using the ultimatum game (G uth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982).
However, such ndings can potentially be accommodated in an extended version of the
framework presented by Cox et al. (2008). It is the signicant dierence in the extent of
single-peakedness across TB and TE which is hard to reconcile.
15The extent of single-peakedness is identical across treatments DB and DM. However, this should be
regarded as a coincidence since, as explained earlier, these two treatments are not truly comparable because
they allow for dierent numbers of theoretically feasible single-peaked rankings. A similar argument applies
for the comparison between treatments TB and TM.
16This result seems to be driven by women [P = 0:073, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test] but not men
[P = 0:420, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test].
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Rank (9,11) in TB (10,10) in TE y
N M W N M W N M W
1st 17 9 8 30 12 18 13 3 10
2nd 12 6 6 13 8 5 1 2 -1
3rd 3 2 1 6 4 2 3 2 0
4th 6 3 3 12 6 6 6 3 3
5th 58 28 30 35 18 17 -23 -10 -13
Total 96 48 48 96 48 48 0 0 0
Notes:  reports the dierence between the frequency of (10;10) and (9;11) at a given rank.
Table 5 presents the rank-distribution of alternatives (9;11) and (10;10) in treatments
TB and TE, respectively. Alternative (10;10) is ranked fth in treatment TE with a
signicantly lower frequency than alternative (9;11) is in TB [2(1) = 11:032, P = 0:001].
This result holds separately for men [2(1) = 4:174, P = 0:041] and women [2(1) =
7:045, P = 0:008]. In contrast, alternative (10;10) is ranked rst in treatment TE with a
signicantly higher frequency than the alternative (9;11) is in treatment TB [2(1) = 4:761,
P < 0:029]. Statistically, this result is driven by women [2(1) = 5:275, P = 0:022] since
we do not nd such an eect for men [2(1) = 0:549, P = 0:459].
To summarize, both men and women seem to rank (10;10) in TE relatively higher than
(9;11) in TB; but, women seem to be more likely to place alternative (10;10) at the top
of their ranking. These subtle dierences, however, do not seem to in
uence the overall
extent of single-peakedness across men and women in TE. Almost identical numbers of
men and women violate single-peakedness in treatment TE.
5.3. Who violates single-peakedness?
A subject facing the task of ranking the alternatives probably has to resolve several ques-
tions. Just deciding which alternative to rank rst may involve several considerations
depending on the nature of the set of alternatives: whether to give anything to other or
not; if so, how much; should one be willing to accept a lower monetary payo than the
other individual or forsake eciency for equality? Whether the ranking reported by a
subject is single-peaked or not is likely to be determined by the number and the nature of
considerations a subject undertakes. A regression specication where single-peakedness is
the dependant variable is perhaps less subject to endogeneity concerns. Hence, our analysis
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variable takes the value 1 if the ranking reported by a subject is single-peaked and takes
the value 0 if the ranking reported by a subject is non-single-peaked.
Subjects are classied only in terms of their AAI in treatments DB, TB, and TE, while
they are classied using both AAI and ADI in treatments DM and TM. We will therefore
analyze the two sets of treatments separately. Our focus shall be on examining whether the
likelihood of reporting a single-peaked ranking varies systematically across subjects who
dier in terms of their AAI and/or ADI. Successful empirical validation of the analytical
framework of other-regarding preferences requires that subjects who reveal positive and/or
negative regard for payos of other (which is captured by AAI and ADI, respectively)
should be as likely to report single-peaked rankings as are the self-regarding subjects.
5.3.1. Treatments DB, TB, and TE
Table 6 reports the marginal eects and robust standard errors from Probit regressions.
The main result emerging from Model 1 is that, on average, the likelihood of single-
peakedness is relatively lower for subjects who show higher AAI. Recall that the variable
AAI stands for the amount given to other according to one's rst-ranked alternative in
treatments DB, TB, and TE. Thus, subjects who are relatively more generous according
to their rst-ranked alternative are relatively more likely to violate single-peakedness.
Model 1 conrms that the likelihood of single-peakedness does not dier across men
and women. It also conrms that subjects in treatment TE are signicantly less likely to be
single-peaked relative to TB. We have already reported in Section 5.2 that subjects behave
slightly more generously in terms of their rst-ranked alternatives in treatment TE which
contains the (10;10) alternative than in treatment TB which instead contains the (9;11)
alternative. Does this feature drive the signicantly lower incidence of single-peakedness in
treatment TE relative to TB? The statistical insignicance of the interaction between the
AAI variable and the TE treatment dummy in Model 2 eectively rules out this hypothesis.
Table 7 reports the (average) predicted probability of being single-peaked for sub-
jects diering in terms of AAI based on Model 2.17 The predicted probability of single-
peakedness is nearly 87% for the self-regarding subjects in DB or TB who gave 0 according
to their rst-ranked alternative. The corresponding probability for subjects who gave 9
according to their rst-ranked alternative in DB or TB is 0.66. The probability of single-
peakedness is uniformly lower in treatment TE relative to treatments TB and drops to a
low of 0.40 for subjects who gave 10 according to their rst-ranked alternative.18
17Predicted probability of being single-peaked is calculated for each individual using the estimated
coecients. Subjects with the same AAI are pooled together and the average of their predicted probabilities
is reported.
18We discuss our preferred explanation for this dierence in the concluding section.
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Notes: The table reports marginal eects of Probit estimations. The dependent variable takes the value
(0) 1 if an individual's ranking is (non) single-peaked. DB and TE are treatment dummies. AAI refers to
aversion towards advantageous inequality. Treatment TB is the baseline. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Constant included.    P < 0:1;    P < 0:05;    P < 0:01.
Table 7: Predicted probability of single-peakedness in DB, TB, and TE based on Model 2
Treatment Increasing AAI !
g1 = 0 g1 = 2 g1 = 4 g1 = 7 g1 = 9;10
DB, TB 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.66
(36, 47) (10, 10) (9, 9) (17, 13) (24, 17)
TE 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.48 0.40
(45) (6) (5) (10) (30)
Notes: g1 refers to the amount given to other according to the rst-ranked alternative. Treatment TE
contains the (10;10) alternative instead of the (9;11) alternative. The reported probabilities are based
on Model 2 presented in Table 7. The numbers in parentheses report the number of subjects in the
corresponding cell of the table. The qualitative results do not change if we pool subjects in the three
middle categories of AAI where g1 2 f2;4;7g.
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AAI by giving more to other according to their rst-ranked alternative are, on average,
relatively less likely to be single-peaked. This suggests that generosity runs out more often
than selshness runs out.
Is this result a behavioral regularity or merely a statistical one? Consider treatment DB
where a subject can give 0, 2, 4, 7, or 9 to other according to his rst-ranked alternative.
Irrespective of which alternative is ranked rst, the remaining four alternatives can be
arranged in 24 ways. Now suppose the rst-ranked alternative is giving 0 to other. Out of
the 24 possible arrangements of the remaining four alternatives only 1 will make the overall
ranking of the ve alternatives single-peaked. In general, 1, 4, 6, 4, and 1 out of the 24
arrangements of the remaining four alternatives will make the overall ranking single-peaked
when the rst-ranked alternative is giving 0, 2, 4, 7, or 9, respectively (see Table 2). Clearly,
subjects who give relatively more to other according to their rst-ranked alternative are not
uniformly less likely to exhibit single-peakedness based on purely statistical considerations.
We, therefore, believe that this result reveals a behavioral, and not, a statistical regularity.
The regression results do not lend support to another intuitively appealing explanation
of the likelihood of single-peakedness. It is tempting to think that subjects who start with
giving 0 or giving 9 (or, 10 in TE) to other as their rst-ranked alternative would be more
likely to be single-peaked relative to subjects who start with giving 2, 4, or 7 because of
the relative ease of coming up with a ranking. The data do reveal that subjects whose
rst ranked alternative is giving 0 are signicantly more likely to be single-peaked than
subjects who start with giving 2, 4, or 7. However, subjects who start with giving 9 (or,
10) to other as their rst-ranked alternative are less likely to be single-peaked than those
who start with giving 2, 4, or 7. Thus, focusing on the relative ease of coming up with a
ranking does not provide a coherent explanation for the patterns observed in the data.
5.3.2. Treatments DM and TM
The analysis of treatments DB, TB, and TE revealed that positively other-regarding ten-
dencies, as captured by AAI, reduce the likelihood of single-peakedness. Treatments DM
and TM allow us to examine whether the same holds with respect to negatively other-
regarding tendencies which are captured by ADI.
Preferences of a subject will be non-monotonic with respect to the payo of other if
alternative (10;10) is ranked above (16;11) irrespective of the exact placement of these
two alternatives in the overall ranking. A non-monotonic preference ranking is equivalent
to revealing ADI. As discussed earlier, treatments DM and TM allow a more rened classi-
cation of subjects. Subjects can be classied both in terms of their AAI and ADI. Before
analyzing the Probit regressions we note that about 30% of the subjects rank the alterna-
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(see Table A4 in the Supplement). There is no dierence in the proportion of subjects who
exhibit non-monotonicity across treatments DM and TM [2(1) = 0:099, P = 0:753].19
Results of Probit regressions for treatments DM and TM are reported in Table 8. Model
1 reveals signicantly negative marginal eects of AAI and ADI. The results from Model
1 can be summarized as follows.
1. Increasing AAI reduces the likelihood of single-peakedness irrespective of whether
subjects show ADI or not.
2. Subjects who show ADI are less likely to be single-peaked than those who do not, at
all levels of AAI.
Consider one of the key dierences between treatments DB and DM. A subject in treat-
ment DM faces the additional consideration of how to rank the ecient (16;11) alternative
relative to the inecient but `equal' (10;10) alternative; a consideration which is absent in
treatment DB given the set of alternatives. The manner in which a subject resolves this
consideration determines whether or not we label him as ADI in treatment DM. It is pos-
sible that the marginal impact of this consideration on the likelihood of single-peakedness
varies with the level of AAI. For instance, the marginal eect could be relatively lower for
subjects who reveal stronger AAI as such subjects are already quite likely to be non-single-
peaked based on the ndings from treatments DB. There is no theory to suggest that the
opposite case is not possible. Hence, Model 2m reported in Table 8 examines this issue by
including the interaction of AAI and ADI as an additional regressor.
The positive and statistically signicant marginal eect of the interaction term in Model
2m helps us revise the ndings from Model 1m in the following manner (see Table 9 for the
predicted probabilities of single-peakedness based on the results from Model 2m).
1. Increasing AAI reduces the likelihood of single-peakedness among subjects who do
not show ADI but has no impact on those who show ADI.
2. Subjects who show ADI are less likely to be single-peaked than those who do not at
all but the highest level of AAI (conrmed by t-tests at the 5% signicance level).
The common result from both Models 1m and 2m is that that having a high AAI or
being ADI decreases the likelihood of single-peakedness. In other words, presence of posi-
tive and/or negative other regarding tendency reduces the likelihood of single-peakedness
relative to the absence of both which goes against the implicit assumption of the existing
theories of other-regarding preferences.
19The proportion of women who exhibit non-monotonicity (40%) is higher than the corresponding
proportion of men (20%). This result is in line with those reported by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2002)
and surveyed by Croson and Gneezy (2009).
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Notes: Same as Table 8 with the appropriate modications in view of the treatments involved.
Table 9: Predicted probability of single-peakedness in DM and TM based on Model 2m
Increasing AAI !
gm
1 = 0 gm
1 = 4 gm
1 = 7 gm
1 = 10
Not ADI 0.95 0.89 0.78 0.66
(61) (19) (20) (34)
ADI 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.69
(18) (16) (4) (20)
Notes: gm
1 refers to the amount given to other according to the rst-ranked alternative among the four
alternatives excluding (16;11). A subject is (not) ADI if he ranks alternative (16;11) (above) below
alternative (16;11). The numbers in parentheses report the number of subjects in the corresponding cell




Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 041Table 10: Single-peakedness across self-regarding and other-regarding subjects
Type of Treatment















Notes: The entries in the table should be read as follows: single-peaked rankings were reported by 159
out of the 189 subjects across all treatments who can be classied as self-regarding.
We conclude the discussion of who violates single-peakedness by reporting the pro-
portion of self-regarding and (positively and/or negatively) other-regarding subjects who
exhibit single-peakedness (Table 10). We have labeled subjects as self-regarding if (i) g1 = 0
in treatments DB, TB, and TE and (ii) gm
1 = 0 and (16;11) is ranked above (10;10) in
treatments DM and TM. All remaining subjects belong to the other-regarding category.
About 84% of self-regarding subjects and 68% of other-regarding subjects exhibit non-
single-peakedness in the pooled data.
5.4. Where does non-single-peakedness arise?
We wrap up the data analysis by highlighting another interesting pattern in the data.
Consider treatments DB, TB, and TE where the notion of single-peakedness is dened
over all the ve alternatives. We shall refer to an alternative in terms of the amount that
can be given to other. Suppose a subject's rst-ranked alternative is, say, 4. If his second-
ranked alternative is either 0 or 9, then even without knowing the rest of his ranking we
can unambiguously conclude that his overall ranking will be non-single-peaked. In such a
scenario, we shall say that the subject exhibited non-single-peakedness for the rst time
at his `second-ranked' alternative. In contrast, if his second-ranked alternative is 2 or 7 we
can not yet conclude that his overall ranking is single-peaked or non-single-peaked.
Suppose the subject's rst two alternatives are 4  2. If the third-ranked alternative is
9, then the subject's ranking will denitely be non-single-peaked and we shall say that the
subject exhibited non-single-peakedness for the rst time at his `third-ranked' alternative.
In contrast, if his third-ranked alternative is 7 or 0, then we can not yet be conclusive.
Now suppose the rst three alternatives are 4  2  0. If the fourth-ranked alternative is
9, then his ranking will be non-single-peaked and we shall say that he exhibited non-single-
peakedness for the rst time at his `fourth-ranked' alternative. In contrast, if his rst four
alternatives are 4  2  0  7, then his ranking must be single-peaked.
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rst time?
First violation of SPness Treatments
















Notes: The entries in the table should be read as follows: 10 out of the total 20 violations of single-
peakedness in treatment DB occurred at the second rank. The numbers in the parentheses report the
corresponding percentage rounded o to the nearest integer.
In general, in treatments DB, TB, and TE, we can go through the subject's ranking
and identify where he exhibited non-single-peakedness for the rst time. Any subject can
do so at the second, third, or fourth rank. Table 11 reveals that most violations of single-
peakedness occur at the second rank while least number of violations occur at the fourth
rank in treatments DB, TB, and TE.20
This pattern will prove useful in the discussion of potential reasons for violations of
single-peakedness in the following section. At present, we wish to highlight that it allays
a potentially important concern with the choice of probabilities in our experiment. Recall
that the probability of the rst, second, third, fourth, or fth ranked alternative being used
to determine the payos in our treatments are 0:50, 0:30, 0:15, 0:05, and 0:00, respectively.
It could be argued that a probability of 0:05 is `too close' to a probability of 0:00 and this
could contribute heavily to non-single-peakedness at the fourth rank.
To elaborate the concern, consider a subject in treatment DB. Suppose his true ranking
{ in terms of the amounts given to other { is the single-peaked ranking 9  7  4  2  0.
It is possible that the subject instead reports the non-single-peaked ranking 9  7  4 
0  2 because he treats the probability of 0:05 to be eectively 0:00. Such a concern
does not seem to materialize in the data as rst occurrence of non-single-peakedness is
mostly observed at the second rank. In fact, this result eectively holds conditional on the
rst-ranked alternative and/or gender of the subjects.
20The analysis for treatments DM and TM is slightly dierent because single-peakedness is dened with
respect to only four alternatives. The qualitative results presented here hold in treatments DM and TM
as well and are described in the Supplement.
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Most studies in the experimental literature on other-regarding preferences test a particular
theory or compare competing theories. In a pioneering paper, Andreoni and Miller (2002)
asked a far more general question: \Can subjects' concerns for altruism or fairness be
expressed in the economists' language of a well-behaved preference ordering?" They elicited
choices of subjects in a series of dictator games with varying pie sizes and prices of giving
to another subject and tested whether choices are consistent with the Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982). Almost all subjects behaved as if
they were maximizing a utility function representing a well-behaved preference ordering.
We draw upon the work of Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) to extend the analysis
of the question raised by Andreoni and Miller. As understanding the structure of the un-
derlying preference orderings is the main motivation, we devise a mechanism to directly
elicit preference orderings. Well-behaved orderings over collinear sure alternatives specify-
ing sure material payos to self and other are single-peaked as per the assumptions of the
existing theories of other-regarding preferences.21 Our key ndings are summarized below.
[F1] Single-peakedness is signicantly lower is treatment TE which contains alternative
(10;10) relative to treatment TB which instead contains (9;11).
[F2] Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are less likely to report single-
peaked rankings than self-regarding subjects.
[F3] Non single-peakedness arises for the rst time relatively more towards the top rather
than the bottom of subjects rankings irrespective of the rst-ranked alternative.
[F4] We nd no dierence in the likelihood of single-peakedness across (i) men and women
and (ii) dictators and comparable trustees.
[F5] Nearly 16% of the self-regarding subjects and 32% of the other-regarding subjects
reported non-single-peaked rankings.
In the following, we delineate the potential reasons for violations of single-peakedness,
discuss the challenges involved in systematically exploring them in future studies, and
highlight some potential directions for related theoretical and experimental work.
21To the best of our knowledge, Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie (2003) is the only prior study that
mentions the notion of single-peakedness in the context of other-regarding preferences. However, the
manner in which we exploit this notion is very dierent.
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Can we attribute non-single-peakedness to random errors on part of the subjects? We be-
lieve violations of single-peakedness can only be partly attributed to errors because there
is a systematic pattern to who violates single-peakedness and where single-peakedness is
violated in subjects' rankings as summarized in ndings [F2] and [F3]. It seems unsatis-
factory to dismiss patterns of behavior that the existing framework can not accommodate
as errors in the decision making process.
Theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences model the preferences of an in-
dividual over sure alternatives where each sure alternative species sure material payos
for self and other. Preferences over sure alternatives are modeled with the help of one
binary relation. The binary relation is assumed to satisfy a set of core axioms. From
a theoretical perspective, this modeling approach immediately suggests the following two
sources of non-single-peakedness in our experiment.
[S1] Preferences over sure alternatives cannot be modeled with only one binary relation.
[S2] Preferences can be modeled with one binary relation but one or more of the core
preference axioms are violated.
Our experiment does not allow us to unambiguously pin-point [S1] or [S2] as the source
of any particular violation of single-peakedness. We shall argue that distinguishing [S1]
from [S2] is a non-trivial empirical problem which is dicult, if not impossible, to resolve
irrespective of how one chooses to implement the experiment. However, we shall also argue
that the observed patterns in violations of single-peakedness suggest that all violations of
single-peakedness can potentially be explained by appealing only to [S1]. In contrast, it
seems dicult to do so by appealing to [S2] alone.
To see the behavioral role of [S1], suppose a subject in the DB treatment reports the
non-single-peaked ranking 9  0  2  4  7 in terms of the amounts given to other. It
is possible that the subject uses two `rationales' (in a sequential manner) to come up with
this ranking (Tadenuma, 1998; Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler, 2002; Manzini and Mari-
otti, 2007). The rst rationale focusses on identifying the most `generous' alternative and
ranking it rst while the second rationale involves focussing on one's own payo thereafter.
[S1] can, in principle, be used to provide an explanation for ndings [F1], [F2], and [F3].
We rst explain [F1] { the signicant dierence in the extent of single-peakedness across
TB and TE. We do so by adapting the arguments put forth by Sen (1993), McFadden
(1999), and Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) in a related context. Consider a trustee
in treatment TB faced with the task of ranking the alternatives which involve giving 0, 2, 4,
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noting that they involve giving dierent amounts to other. The presence of the equal-split
alternative in treatment TE, perhaps, disturbs this uni-dimensional interpretation of the
alternatives. A signicant fraction of subjects may think that giving 10 not only amounts
to giving the most but it is the `fair' thing to do as well. This informal description can
be formally captured by allowing a higher-dimensional description of alternatives or by
modeling preferences with the help of multiple binary relations.22
[S1] is consistent with patterns regarding who violates single-peakedness (nding [F2])
and where single-peakedness is violated (nding [F3]). If a subject uses two rationales
with the rst one focussed on generosity and the second one focussed on payos to self,
then what we refer to non-single-peakedness because generosity runs out, can be explained.
Similarly, non-single-peakedness when selshness runs out could be due to the possibility
that a subject uses the same two rationales but in the reverse order.23
One could potentially construct preference structures with the help of only one binary
relation that violate one or more of the core preference axioms and allow us to rationalize
the signicant dierence in single-peakedness across TB and TE. Such a rationalization
would be compelling if it is accompanied with a behavioral explanation as to why the
preferences have such a structure without implicitly or explicitly appealing to [S1]. It is
exceedingly hard to provide a behavioral explanation for ndings [F1], [F2], and [F3] by
appealing only to violations of the core preference axioms.
6.2. Probabilistic and non-probabilistic elicitation mechanisms
We use a probabilistic mechanism to infer the preferences over sure alternatives. Prefer-
ences over sure alternatives can be extended to preferences over lotteries (whose potential
outcomes are the sure alternatives) by using any theory of decision making under risk.
Thus, from a theoretical perspective, non-single-peakedness in our experiment can also be
attributed to the following source.
[S3] Preferences over sure alternatives can be modeled with one binary relation that sat-
ises the core axioms but preferences over lotteries are such that the reported ranking can
not be unambiguously interpreted as the preference ranking over the sure alternatives. (see
[Q1] in Section 3.2.2.).
22The language in which a subject describes the set of alternatives to himself may be such that it ceases
to be a subset of R2
+. The interested reader may refer to Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) for a
discussion of why relying on multiple binary relations is an appropriate way of modeling such situations.
23The choice of the probabilities used to determine payos { 0.50, 0.30, 0.15, 0.05, 0.00 { suggests that
a subject who uses these two rationales should switch from a generous (selsh) rst-ranked alternative to
a selsh (generous) alternative primarily at the second rank.
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DB is 9  7  4  2  0. Further suppose that his preferences over lotteries can not
be modeled using any theory of decision making under risk which leads to an armative
answer to [Q1] in Section 3.2.2. In such a case, the subject could report the non-single-
peaked ranking 9  0  2  4  7 instead of his true ranking. However, it would
be inaccurate to conclude that the subject's ranking over the sure alternatives is not in
line with the existing theories of other-regarding preferences because the the elicitation
mechanism would be the real source of the observed non-single-peakedness.
Non-single-peakedness in our experiment is consistent with [S3]. However, [S3] does not
seem to provide a fundamental explanation for the dierences in single-peakedness across
treatments TB and TE because it seems dicult to explain why the MDP mechanism would
be the source of non-single-peakedness signicantly more often in TE without implicitly
or explicitly appealing to [S1]. To press the idea further, recall that we nd (i) weakly
signicant dierences in the distribution of rst-ranked alternatives and (ii) strongly sig-
nicant dierences in the extent of single-peakedness across treatments TB and TE. G uth
et al. (2001) report results from mini-ultimatum games with and without the equal-split.
The proposer could propose (10;10) or (3;17) in their `equal-split' treatment (with the
rst entry referring to the payo for the recipient). In the `no-equal-split' treatment, the
proposer could propose (9;11) or (3;17). Alternative (3;17) is proposed signicantly more
often in the `no-equal-split' treatment. Similar results are obtained by Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher (2003).24
It is crucial to note that these ndings can not be explained by appealing to [S3]
because Gueth et al. (2001) and Falk et al. (2003) elicit choices of proposers using a non-
probabilistic mechanism. In contrast, a reasoning along the lines of [S1] can potentially
explain these ndings as the presence of the equal-split alternative may induce a signicant
fraction of subjects to cognitively represent the alternatives in a multi-dimensional way
which, in turn, would be equivalent to saying that subjects employ multiple binary relations
to arrive at their choice.
Unfortunately, no currently known probabilistic mechanism seems capable of unam-
biguously distinguishing between [S1]/[S2] and [S3] as the source of any given violation
of single-peakedness. As an example, consider an alternative way of implementing the
treatment DB. The dictator can be asked to make a choice from all the subsets of the
set of alternatives that contain at least two alternatives. One of the choice problems can
be selected randomly for payment with all choice problems being equally likely to be se-
24In general, the experimental literature on bargaining contains several studies that highlight the role of
the availability of equal-split. In a recent study Anbarci and Feltovich (2011) nd that responsiveness to
changes in the disagreement outcome is relatively higher when one agent has a disagreement payo above
half the pie size (so that 50-50 splits are not individually rational).
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or not the inferred ranking over the alternatives is single-peaked. One would not be able
to pin-point the precise reason for violations of single-peakedness even with this design.
[S1]/[S2] clearly qualify as potential reasons. [S3] can also be a potential reason because
the probabilistic payment mechanism may not provide subjects the incentive to truthfully
report their preferred choice across all choice problems (Cox, 2010).25
We have included the discussion of [S3] as part of methodological issues because it is
the choice of the MDP mechanism that forces us to entertain [S3] as a potential source
of non-single-peakedness. A non-probabilistic mechanism will rule out [S3], a priori, as
a potential source of non-single-peakedness but will introduce a dierent concern. Con-
sider yet another way of implementing the treatment DB where (i) a subject is asked to
choose an alternative from all the subsets of the set of alternatives that contain at least
two alternatives and (ii) he is paid for all the choice problems. This payment mechanism
eliminates any appeal to preferences over lotteries. But, it does not address the actual
question of interest. When a subject is paid for the decision made in every choice problem,
we do not elicit the preferences of the subject over a xed set of alternatives. The payment
received by the subject alters the set of alternatives he actually faces as he proceeds with
the task of making choices. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, both probabilistic and
non-probabilistic mechanisms seem incapable of pin-pointing the source of violations of
single-peakedness.26
6.3. Concluding remarks
The question raised by Andreoni and Miller (2002) exemplies that the literature on other-
regarding preferences aims to go beyond as if explanations for observed choices and gain
a better understanding of the underlying preferences (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Blanco, Engel-
mann, and Norman, 2011). The goal of this literature makes it pertinent to devise ways to
chip away at the as if approach and directly investigate the preference structure.27 Elic-
iting rankings and testing their single-peakedness is a step in this direction. At the very
least, it provides signicantly more information about the structure of individual prefer-
ences at no additional monetary cost to the experimenter since the rst-ranked alternatives
are quite likely to serve as a very good proxy for the choice subjects would have made if
they were asked to choose an alternative.
25The interested reader may refer to Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2011) for a detailed discussion.
26We used the MDP mechanism because it does not seem to be any worse than the non-probabilistic
mechanisms. In addition, it is a novel mechanism which could potentially be employed to address questions
related to preference structures beyond the domain of other-regarding preferences.
27It is often the case that choices made by subjects are used to estimate the parameters of a 
exible
utility function (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits, 2007). Such an exercise would
become signicantly more meaningful if the underlying preferences are indeed single-peaked.
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sure alternatives to lotteries with expected utility theory involves a fundamental con
ict
between the IIA axiom and behaviorally appealing notions of ex-ante fairness. This sug-
gests caution while interpreting theoretical predictions of strategic interactions between
agents having other-regarding preferences since analyzing strategic interactions between
agents with other-regarding preferences necessarily involves extending preferences over sure
alternatives to preferences over lotteries.28 As highlighted by Fudenberg and Levine (2011),
a fruitful direction for future research would be to devise other-regarding preference struc-
tures that are behaviorally sound and can be extended from sure alternatives to lotteries
in empirically valid ways.
Recent advances in individual choice theory suggest that a framework which models
preferences using multiple binary relations may provide a better understanding of indi-
vidual behavior (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007). Such an approach could be an interesting
avenue for future theoretical and experimental research on other-regarding preferences as
it naturally extends the idea of modeling preferences with only one binary relation (Tade-
numa, 1998; Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler, 2002; Manzini and Mariotti, 2007). In addi-
tion, it could provide a route to formalize the suggestion that individuals might be using
a family of rules of thumb or heuristics (Cox, 2004; Wilson, 2010).
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